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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
may have voted in favor of a pension plan with full knowledge that com-
pany executives would receive large benefits. In such a case, the majority
stockholders' determination is entitled to a presumption of good faith.6'
Although the courts almost always review the reasonableness of a
pension as determinative of whether a pension plan is valid, this consider-
ation is not always germane to the issue. In the Fogelson case, the largest
pension other than the president's was $7,285. Obviously, the formula
under the plan as applied to the salaries of lower paid employees resulted
in a reasonable pension, and no objection was made. Thus, the only
cause for the unreasonableness of the president's pension, if it was unrea-
sonable, was that his salary was excessive before the plan was adopted.
This factor may be a reason to attack the excessive salary of the executive,
but it is no justification for attacking a pension plan which is valid.
CONCLUSION
Pension plans benefit both employer and employee. Employer bene-
fits continue to vest in the future as well as at present. Courts should
consider these factors when determining the validity of a plan in which
employee benefits are based on past service.
In deciding the validity of plans in which benefits are based on future
service, courts should consider the reasonableness of the benefits to all
employees. Selecting one possibly overcompensated employee and testing
the plan by the amount of his benefit does not present a fair picture of
the total plan.
PAUL C. MORRISON
Patent Misuse -Attempts to Collect Royalties
on Expired Patents
The general law of contracts applies as well to patent license agree-
ments as to other types of agreements, but peculiarities of the patent law,
influenced as it is by court decisions concerning mis-use and anti-trust,
has made patent licensing a field in which few fools rush in and where
perhaps even angels would fear to tread.'
The matter of the payment of royalties on an expired patent has been
the issue of a considerable amount of litigation. Although the prob-
lem appears well settled when there is no provision in the license re-
quiring such payments, the converse is true when the license contains a
provision demanding the payment of royalties on expired patents. The
decisions which enforce such license provisions are founded on contract
61. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Ad. 654 (Ch. 1928).
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law, while those denying the enforceability of such provisions are based
on patent law. Before embarking on a discussion of the conflicting
theories, a brief discussion of the rights and duties of a patent owner is
advisable.
THE PATENT LAWS
The principal objective of the patent laws is "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts,"2 and not to reward the inventor.3  In an
effort to accomplish this broad objective, Congress has given the in-
ventor the opportunity to secure the material rewards of his invention
for a period of seventeen years in return for his full disclosure of the
invention to the public. At the end of the statutory period, the public
is free to use the invention.4
PATENT LICENSES
Congress has provided for the assignment of patents and has granted
the assignee the same exclusive rights as the patentee.5 A license under
a patent, however, is a contract which merely grants the licensee the
right to use, make, or sell the patented invention.' Title to the inven-
tion remains with the patentee. Since licenses arise out of a contract
arrangement, they are subject to all applicable contract law.' It gen-
erally is understood that when two persons enter into a contract, they
may do so under any condition which is satisfactory to both parties.
1. MacCutcheon, Patent Licensing Do's and Dont's, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 658, 680 (1953).
2. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; Commenting on the function of the patent system, Judge Rich re-
cently said: "It is not like a system of military awards in which medals are given out by the
people to their heroes as expressions of gratitude for their exceptional services. While the
element of reward is one factor in the patent system, it is probably the least important. The
patent system is an incentive system calculated to do two things, principally. First, it stimu-
lates work, research, development, invention, and discovery by holding out the prospect of
profit. Second, in exchange for and as a condition of the patent protection, it secures a full
.disclosure of the invention. Promotion of the useful arts takes place through the combination
of these two factors, the doing of the work and the disclosure of the results thereof.... The
biggest contribution the patent system makes to progress is to induce a steady flow of contribu-
tions and to secure their continuous disclosure. Application of Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 182
(C.CP.A. 1960).
3. "'While one great object [of our patent laws) was, by holding out a reasonable reward
to inventors and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to
stimulate the efforts of genius, the main object was "to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts." ' " Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511
(1917), quoting Pennock v. Dialoque, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
4. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163
U.S. 169 (1896).
5. The right to sell or assign a patent is statutory. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1958).
6. The authority to license a patent is not statutory. The right to relinquish the power to
exclude is inherent with respect to any property. Folk, Scope and Limitations of the Patent
Monopoly, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOWY 135, 141 (1940).
7. DeForest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927).
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These conditions usually are concerned with provisions such as the length
of time of the contract and the amount of money to be paid in return.
Since the licenses in question are based on a patented invention,
patent law must be considered when entering into the contract arrange-
ment. The courts generally have held that when a patentee enters into
a license agreement, he may do so "for any royalty, or upon any con-
dition, the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which
the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure."8 The patent
laws have made it clear that it is the public interest which is dominant
in the patent system and prevents the patentee from using his patent in
such a manner as to acquire a monopoly outside the terms of his grant.
When a licensor imposes conditions on the licensee which are beyond
the scope of his statutory monopoly,10 the courts generally hold him guilty
of patent misuse and refuse to enforce the otherwise valid contract."
THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE
12
Scope of Patents
It is now well established that the scope of a patent is limited to
the invention described in the claims contained in the patent." The
claims, of course, must be read in light of the specifications.'4 The owner
of the patent can exclude the manufacture, use, or sale of only what is
specifically within the scope of his patent. Whenever a patentee utilizes
his patent in a manner not encompassed by these limits and thereby
encroaches on someone else's rights, he is subject to a charge of patent
misuse.
Expansion of the Patent Monopoly
A patentee cannot utilize his patent to monopolize or control the
sale or use of unpatented devices. For example, when a patent license
8. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
9. Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); F. C. Russell Co. v. Consum-
ers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1955); Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp., 150 F. Supp.
384 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
10. The term patent monopoly is used loosely. A monopoly generally deprives the public
of something it has enjoyed freely. In the case of a patent monopoly, the public is not denied
the use of anything it already possessed. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178 (1933). A patent grant actually gives the public something - the right to use the fruits
of invention after a seventeen year period. If it were not for this patent grant, the public
conceivably would never have benefit from an invention since the inventor would constantly
fear losing his secret to the general public with the subsequent loss of all reward.
11. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 902 (1959).
12. An excellent discussion of the history of the misuse doctrine is found in Nicoson, The
Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 76 (1962).
13. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917),
14. Ibid.
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requires as a condition of the license that the licensee use only the
licensor's non-patented materials with the patented article, the patentee
has expanded his monopoly to one which is greater than that intended by
the patent laws. Likewise, a patentee cannot use his patent monopoly as
a means of suppressing competition, 5 nor can it be enlarged for the
exploitation of another less valuable patent."8 Specific examples of
such contract provisions which have been held to be a misuse of the
patent monopoly when used to expand the monopoly include: package
licensing (forcing a licensee to take a license on several patents in order
to get a license on one);"T grant-back provisions (requiring the licensee
to assign all subsequent improvement patents to the licensor);8 re-
strictions on price (e.g., the price at which the licensee may sell the
patented product);19 and the payment of royalties after the expiration of
the patent. This note will be confined primarily to a discussion of the
decisions concerned with the last named provision.
Birth of the Patent Misuse Doctrine
The patent misuse doctrine was first promulgated in Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.2" The Supreme Court held that
the owner of a patent on a film feeding device for motion-picture pro-
jectors could not require exclusive use of his unpatented film with his
patented machine. The Court stated that the defendant was not guilty of
infringement when using a material with a patented device if that ma-
terial was not within the scope of the patent monopoly. Prior to this
case, a patentee was permitted to condition licenses of patent rights upon
the purchase from the patentee of materials used in conjunction with the
patented article.2 ' Thus, the Supreme Court in the Motion Picture case
eliminated the use of so-called tying clauses by classifying them as un-
lawful extensions of the patent grant and thus patent misuse. Although
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had utilized the Clay-
ton Acte in striking down the tying clause, the Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion without resorting to the antitrust laws.
15. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
16. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
17. E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
18. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
19. E.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
20. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
21. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
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Contrary to Public Policy
The patent misuse doctrine was further defined in Morton Salt Co.
v. G. S. Suppiger Co.23 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was
attempting to extend its patent monopoly to unpatented articles and,
therefore, an action for infringement of its patent was "contrary to public
policy .... ,"24 As a result, relief was denied until the "consequences of
the misuse of the patent 23 had been dissipated.
The public policy argument was again used by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Univis Lens Co.,26 where the Court held that
public policy ... limits the .. .monopoly strictly to the terms of the
statutory grant ... [and] the particular form or method by which the
monopoly is sought to be extended is immaterial.27
In National Lock Washer Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.,28 a court of
appeals maintained that since a patent is an exclusive privilege granted
"'in furtherance of a public policy'-"9 the owner of such a privilege can-
not claim the protection of his monopoly "'where it is being used to sub-
vert that policy.' "30
PAYMENT OF ROYALTIES BEYOND THE EXPIRATION OF THE PATENT
Where There are No Express Provisions in the License
A number of second circuit decisions have held that in the interpreta-
tion of licensing agreements a presumption exists that royalty payments
are not to be made after the expiration of the patent."' The early cases
so holding added as dictum that any intention to extend the payments be-
yond the term of the patent grant must be dearly expressed in the con-
tract.
For example, in Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney Co.,32 an action involving
a contract concerned with four patents, the defendant refused to pay
royalties on the individual patents as they expired. The court rejected
plaintiff's contention that the language of the contract called for the pay-
22. 38 Stat. §§ 728-43 (1914), 15 U.S.C. $§ 12-27 (1958).
23. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
24. Id. at 494; accord, Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
25. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
26. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
27. Id. at 251-52.
28. 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943).
29. Id. at 256, citing Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
30. Ibid.
31. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundations, Inc., 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937); Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 270 Fed. 518 (2d Cir. 1920); Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney
Co., 108 Fed. 963 (2d Cir. 1901).
32. 108 Fed. 963 (2d Cir. 1901).
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ment of royalties until the expiration of the last issued patent and held
for the defendant. The court went on to say, however,
Parties may, of course, contract as they choose; but, in the absence of
some provision by which a promise for the continuing payment of
royalties upon expired patents may be fairly inferred, the presumption
is that the contract is upon the ordinary terms as to the duration of
[the] royalty 3
The same court, in Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. R., 4 dis-
missed an action for infringement because infringement was not estab-
lished and added: "Although the general rule is that liability to pay royal-
ties terminates upon the expiration of the patent, the parties may contract
to the contrary."as
It is thus apparent that the second circuit court believed that contract
principles determined what the owner of a patent could do with his statu-
tory monopoly, regardless of the seventeen year limitation placed on such
monopolies by the patent statutes. But the court's thoughts on this mat-
ter as precedent can be characterized as mere dicta.
One of the most widely quoted cases is E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemi-
cal Foundation, Inc.3 6 This was an action by Squibb to recover royalties
paid by mistake to the defendant after the expiration of the patents in-
volved in three different license agreements. Each license was scheduled
to run for the term of the patent involved in that license, but royalties
were mistakenly paid after the older patents expired. Defendant con-
tended that the licenses should have been read as a single contract, with
the obligation to pay royalties to run until the expiration of the youngest
patent. The court held that the provision that the royalty was to be paid
"'during the continuance of this license ... granted 'for the term of the
patent unless sooner terminated' "s was definite and should govern. The
court then cited the Sproulls8 and Pressed Steel " cases as authority for the
proposition that any intent to have the royalties paid after the expirationa
of a patent must be "phrased in language from which such intention may
fairly be inferred."40
Since the court in the Squibb decision concluded that the licenses in
issue in the case contained express provisions terminating the payment of
royalties when the patents expired, there is no reason why it should have
proceeded to discuss the presumption in relation to circumstances where
33. Id. at 965.
34. 270 Fed. 518 (2d Cit. 1920).
35. Id. at 525.
36. 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937).
37. Id. at 477.
38. Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 Fed. 963 (2d Cir. 1901).
39. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 270 Fed. 518 (2d Cit. 1920).
40. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 93 F.2d 475, 477 (1937).
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there is no provision for terminating the payment of royalties; for it is
this dictum which is cited so often in later cases to unjustifiably uphold
express provisions calling for the payment of royalties after the patent of
the licensed invention expires.
Another decision involving a license based on a number of patents
is Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. American Ore Reclamation Co.4
The license agreement contained a provision requiring that the license
run "to the full end of the term or terms of each and every of said letters
patent"" now owned or later to be acquired relating to the art of sinter-
ing. The plaintiff contended that payment should be required on every-
thing covered by any of his patents until all of the patents had expired.
The court held that the language of the contract did not support such
an interpretation; it only was necessary for the defendant to pay royalties
on the sinter produced under unexpired patents.
Scapa Dryers, Inc. v. Abney Mills" presented a rather unusual situa-
tion, because the licensee was attempting to extend his patent monopoly.
Hindle (an Englishman) was the owner of United States and foreign
patents relating to looms for weaving dryer felts used in the paper
making industry. In 1939, The Brandon Corporation of South Carolina
(now Abney Mills) entered into an agreement with Hindle which pro-
vided that Brandon would be the exclusive user of the patented looms in
the United States. Thereafter, the patents were assigned to Brandon.
The successor corporation, Abney Mills, contended that the contract pro-
vision gave them an exclusive right to the use of the looms in the United
States, in perpetuity or as long as the corporation existed. Scapa, an Eng-
lish manufacturer of dryer felts under the English patent, incorporated
in Georgia in 1948 and contended that the 1939 contract gave Abney an
exclusive right to the looms only for the life of the patents, which expired
in 1948. Testimony revealed that although the duration of the agree-
ment neither was specified nor discussed at any time during the negotia-
tions, a letter indicated that the franchise payment was to be for the life
of the patents. The court felt that if the agreement was construed as
Abney would have it, Hindle would be prevented forever from selling his
looms in the United States. Such an interference is unwarranted and
is contrary to the following public policy arguments declared by the
Supreme Court:
The aim of the patent laws is not only that members of the public
shall be free to manufacture the product or employ the process dis-
closed by the expired patent, but also that the consuming public at large
shall receive the benefits of the unrestricted exploitation by others, of
its disclosures .... The public has invested in such free use by the grant
41. 44 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
42. Id. at 397.
43. 269 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959).
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of monopoly to the patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted
reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him
of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal de-
vice employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.
44
The court in the Abney case justifiably concluded that the provision was
intended to give exclusive rights for the life of the patents only.
It is now well established that in the absence of an express agreement,
the payment of royalties ceases at the termination date of the patent. "
It has been suggested that the requirement of a dear intention or express
agreement is an indication of an appreciation by the courts of the possible
adverse effect of such agreements on the public interest.4"
Where There is an Express Provision in The License
Package Licensing - Agreement to Pay Royalties Until the
Expiration Date of the Youngest Patent
Although a patentee may not condition the granting of a license un-
der a patent on the acceptance of other patents,47 there are occasions
where package licensing is necessitated because of the complexity of the
technology involved. This practice also is a convenient way to avoid in-
fringement, and may even be suggested by the licensee. Generally, how-
ever, such a grouping will involve patents which expire at different times.
Probably the first case to question the dicta of the earlier decisions
such as the Squibb and Pressed Steel cases, which implied that royalties
could be collected after the expiration of the controlling patent when
specifically stated in the contract,"8 was Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills,
Inc. v. Davis Co.
49
The defendant hosiery company had raised the defense, among others,
that the action of Davis in trying to impose package license agreements
on the industry constituted a violation of the federal anti-trust laws and a
patent misuse. The package license agreement also called for the pay-
ment of royalties to the expiration date of the youngest patent. The court
44. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1945). See also cases
cited notes 23-30 supra.
45. Starke v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 174 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1959), aff'd per
curiam, 283 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1960); Tate v. Lewis, 127 F. Supp. 105 (D. Mass. 1954);
Ohio Citizens Trust Co. v. Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ohio
1944); ELLIS, PATENT LICENSES § 109 (3d ed. Deller 1958); 69 C.J.S. Patents § 262
(1951). In Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 104 Cal. App. 2d 821, 233 P.2d 82 (1951), the
court held that a provision in an agreement to pay royalties on six patents "for the full term of
said patent and any continuation or extension thereof' did not require the payment of royal-
ties on the expired patents.
46. Harmon, Antitrust and Misuse Implications of the Defined Field License, 45 J. PAT.
OFP. SOc'y 463, 473 n.24 (1963).
47. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
48. See cases cited note 31 supra.
49. 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950).
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held that even though the original license agreement required accepting
a license under all six patents, the Davis Co. had subsequently offered to
license in groups of two and even indicated a possibility of further negoti-
ations. Since the new offer also eliminated the provision concerning the
expiration date, the court was not compelled to rule on the issue. It did
volunteer, however, that "such a provision, however, might easily lend
itself to an unreasonable restraint of trade by extending patents beyond
their legal limit .... ""
The Baker-Cammack decision pointed to the anti-trust problem as a
possible consequence of extending the patent monopoly beyond its legal
limit. Therefore, the possibility exists that a patentee trying to take ad-
vantage of contract law to circumvent the patent statutes may violate the
anti-trust laws; the patentee could no longer raise the defense of his gov-
ernment granted monopoly.
In H-P-M Dev. Corp. v. Watson-Stillman Co.,5 the defendant ob-
jected to the provisions of the license agreement calling for the payment
of a royalty on some of the patents in a package which had expired. The
court disregarded the objection because no evidence concerning the ex-
piration dates had been presented. The court went on to say that even
if such evidence had been presented, it would be of no avail since "parties
have been held to have legally agreed to pay royalties upon expired
patents under certain circumstances."52  This statement must be ques-
tioned since the only case cited by the court for this proposition was the
Pressed Steel case5" which, as indicated previously, did not involve any
express agreement for the payment of royalties beyond the expiration date.
Furthermore, the portion of the Pressed Steel decision relied on as author-
ity was dictum.
The H-P-M decision was cited with approval in Automatic Radio
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.54 In this case, the license agreement
covered 570 patents and 200 applications related to the manufacture of
radio broadcasting apparatus. Under the agreement, Automatic Radio
acquired the right to use any or all of the patents and future developments
as desired. For this privilege, they were to pay royalties based upon a
small percentage of sales of complete broadcasting receivers with a mini-
mum payment of $10,000 required per year. Concluding there was no
inherent extension of the patent monopoly, the Supreme Court upheld the
agreement, stating:
In licensing the use of patents to one engaged in a related enterprise,
50. Id. at 573.
51. 71 F. Supp. 906 (D.N.J. 1947).
52. Id. at 913.
53. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 270 Fed. 518 (2d Cir. 1920).
54. 339 U.S. 827, 833 n.7 (1950).
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it is not per se a misuse of patents to measure the consideration by a
percentage of the licensee's sales.55
It is submitted that this decision has not been widely followed in
spite of its logical approach to the problem because of the peculiar fact
situations involved. First, there was a very large number of patents in-
volved, and they defined a fairly narrow field of invention. Under these
circumstances it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which
products utilized licensed patents; a general agreement by the licensee
to pay a percentage of all product sales appears justified. Second, the
licensee did not object to the license arrangement when it was presented
to him. The courts generally have precluded a later objection to pack-
age licensing where acceptance of the entire package was not required
by the licensor. There was no evidence presented in the Hazeltine case
to show that the licensee was compelled to accept the package. Third,
the record was not dear as to whether the licensee's products actually
used the patented inventions. Had evidence been submitted that a large
number of the radios sold were not within the unexpired patents, the
results- might have been different.
Two recent cases involving package licenses have held contrary fi6
the H-P-M and" Hazeltine cases. In American Securit Co. v. Shatter-
proof Glass Corp.,5" an infringement action, the court concluded that
the agieement providing for the payment of royalties until the expiration
of the last patent to expire constituted patent misuse because it would
result in the payment of royalties on expired patents. Although the
Hazeltine decision was cited several times, the circuit court apparently'
accepted the view of Justice Douglas in his dissent in the Hazeltine case"
rather than the majority opinion.
An agreement to pay royalties on one expired patent and one to ex-:
pire in four years was held to constitute misuse of the licensed patents
in Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc.5" The court based its de-
cision on the unauthorized extension of the patent monopoly beyond the
seventeefi year grant. The court also stated that even though the gen-
eral public is still free to use the invention of the expired patent, Prestole
55. Id. at 834. •
56. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). Accord, Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd per
curiam, 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1964).
57. '"The patent owner has therefore used the patents to bludgeon his way into a partnership
with his licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as patented articles. A plainer
extension of a patent by unlawful means would be hard to imagine." Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 839 (1950) (dissent).
58. 271 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960). The court also
noted that although the patentee has the right to refuse to license his invention, he does not
have the right to enlarge his monopoly by attaching conditions to its use.
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cannot be permitted to extend the monopoly of the expired patent as
to its licensee.
One of the significant aspects of the American Securit and Prestole
decisions is the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in both instances de-
spite the apparent inconsistency with the Hazeltine decision. This can
only lead to the conclusion, suggested earlier, that the Hazeltine opinion
must be given a narrow interpretation.
More recently, however, in Thys Co. v. Brulotte,"9 the Supreme Court
of Washington ruled that a provision calling for the payment of royalties
after the expiration of the patent was valid and enforceable. The court
was quick to criticize and dispose of the cases containing opposing
views" by stating that those opinions were either dicta or mere statements
of the rule that a patent cannot be extended beyond its seventeen year
period. The court then went on to cite a number of opinions which also
were dicta6' and apparently relied heavily on Six Star Lubricants Co. v.
Morehouse,6" which did not involve package licensing.
Although the Thys contract involved a number of patents, the court
dismissed defendant's contention that the license was conditioned on the
acceptance of all of the patents since, as in the Hazeltine case, this was
not shown in the record. One could conclude from the decision that
had such facts been presented to the courts, the package licensing in
question would have been held improper.
Licenses Not Involving Package Licensing - Provision Upheld
Six Star Lubricants Co. v. Morehouse" involved a license provision
that royalties would be paid "as long as it manufactures, jobs or sells any
greases or lubricating compounds made according to the said formulae,
or any modification or improvement thereof .. .."" Defendant More-
house refused to pay any royalties after the expiration of the patents
in question. The Supreme Court of Colorado held for the defendant
on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the greases
59. 382 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 905 (1964).
60. Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 964 (1960); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Tinnerman Prods., Inc. v. George K. Garrett Co.,
185 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
833 (1961).
61. E.g., E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937);
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 270 Fed. 518 (2d Cir. 1920). The court cited but
refused to follow Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962),
which admittedly was pertinent to the instant case. Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 382 P.2d 271, 275
n.3 (Wash. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 905 (1964).
62. 101 Colo. 491, 74 P.2d 1239 (1938).
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 493, 74 P.2d at 1240.
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sold corresponded to the patented formulae. The court, however, com-
menting on the defendant's contention that a contract provision requir-
ing the payment of royalties after patents have expired is invalid, went
on to say:
There is no legal inhibition against a party contracting to pay royalty
on a patented artide or formula for a period beyond the date of the
expiration of the patents. 65
It would appear, therefore, that if the plaintiff had succeeded in proving
that the composition of the greases sold was within the license agree-
ment, the court would have relied on contract principles and enforced
the contract even though the patent monopoly was spent. The court
maintained that since the parties entered into the contract knowing that
the contract called for the payment of royalties after the patents had
expired, they could "not now complain of an anticipated condition
brought about by operation of law."6
The court in Adams v. Dyer" also upheld an agreement which was
claimed to require the payment of royalties after the expiration of a
patent.68 It was conceded, however, that the agreement really provided
for a practical way of carrying on the family business, "9 since it called
for two of the children to manufacture and sell the patented article.
They were to pay the remaining children a one per cent royalty on all
sales. The court held that the expiration of the patent could not nullify
the contract and decided the issue solely on the basis of contract law.
This decision cannot be questioned in view of the peculiar facts -in-
volved. Clearly, the agreement concerned the management of a suc-
cessful business operation and was not a license agreement requiring
the payment of royalties on an expired patent." The decision indicates
that the patent defense was added as an afterthought.7
65. Id. at 497, 74 P.2d at 1242. (Citations omitted.)
66. Id. at 498, 74 P.2d at 1243.
67. 129 Cal. App. 2d 160, 276 P.2d 186 (1954).
68. See 31 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 535, 537 n.22, (1963).
69. 129 Cal. App. 2d 160, 161, 276 P.2d 186, 187 (1954).
70. An additional factor which would support the court's conclusion that the contract in.
volved a business and not a patent is found in the patent laws. "In the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use or sell the patented
invention without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners." 35 U.S.C. §
262 (1958). It is suggested that in view of this section, all of the children had the right to
manufacture the Oil Weigh Meters since the patent was left to the children, share and share
alike. 'It is well settled that the above section of title 35 gives one owner of a patent the
right to use the patent without restraint from the other owners and without accounting of
profits. Talbot v. Quaker-State Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967 (3d. Cir. 1939). Therefore, as
part owners of the patent, defendants did not need permission to make the meters and the
agreement could only have been concerned with the family business.
71. The court disposed of this defense without citing any decisions.
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Provision Held to Constitute a Misuse
One case stands alone in the area of licenses not involving package
licenses in which a license was held to constitute a patent misuse. In
Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc.,7" the license agreement called
for the payment of royalties for the life of the machines, regardless of
the expiration of the patent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
believed that its own decision in American Securit"3 and the public policy
arguments of the Scott 4 case compelled it to rule the provision unen-
forceable. The court concluded:
After the expiration .. .the grant of patent monopoly was spent. An
attempt to extend that monopoly by the exaction of royalties thereafter
was unenforceable.75
CONCLUSION
The decisions which have upheld the provision in a license agree-
ment calling for the payment of royalties after the expiration date of the
patent are rationalized on the basis of contract law. These decisions
have expressed the concept that a licensor and a licensee should be able
to agree to pay any consideration and should be able to contract for
any length of time. If such an agreement is reached, the licensee should
not thereafter be permitted to cancel any provision in the contract unless
it is declared unconscionable."0
It is submitted, however, that this concept fails to recognize the
uniqueness of the situation. The position which the licensor holds dur-
ing the contract negotiations is unlike any other because of the grant of
the patent monopoly. The patent gives the licensor the right to exclude.
Without the patent, he is still able to make, use, and sell his invention,
but he lacks the power to exclude others.7 Thus, the patent gives the
72. 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cit. 1962).
73. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
74. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945), a suit for patent infringe-
ment, the question was whether the assignor of a patent is estopped to defend on the ground
that the alleged infringing device is from an expired patent. The Supreme Court said "that the
patent laws preclude the patentee of an expired patent and all others . . .from recapturing
any part of the former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to all the public the ideas
and inventions embodied in an expired patent." Id. at 256.
75. Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496, 510 (3d Cit. 1962).
76. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
77. The owner of a trade secret has no government granted right to exclude. Thus, a li-
cense for the exclusive use of a trade secret (not patented) is valid indefinitely. Warner-
Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). This case
involved a contract containing a provision for the payment of royalties for as long as the
plaintiff manufactured and sold the product of a secret drug formula (Listerine) which was
unpatented. The provision was upheld since there was no patent law or policy involved.
Plaintiff had to continue to pay royalties even though another competitor (not excluded by
any patent) discovered the trade secret and freely produced and sold the product.
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inventor an added advantage in the contract negotiations, and for this
reason there is more than simple contract law involved. Since the
licensor's rights are protected by the patent law, the licensee usually is
forced to accept a license on the licensor's terms or be excluded from
the use of the invention for seventeen years. But for the patent, the
prospective licensee could utilize the invention without paying the in-
ventor any royalty.
78
Since the owner of a patent is given the exclusive right to his in-
vention by patent law, he should not be permitted to rely on contract
law to circumvent the patent statutes which limit his monopoly to seven-
teen years.79 Such attempts should be condemned as patent misuse;
the license provision calling for the payment of royalties after expiration
of the patent should be unenforceable.' ° This rule would not invalidate
the contract during the life of the patent, only the provision in ques-
tion. It appears to be a reasonable approach since as long as the
licensee is paying a fair royalty (agreed upon by both parties) during
the existence of the patent, that portion of the contract should be valid.
The validity of the contract must be scrutinized whenever the licensor's
power under the patent is extended beyond the scope of the government
grant.
The decisions which hold that the licensee need not pay royalties
on an expired patent, regardless of any agreement to the contrary, rest
on the assertion that such agreements constitute an unauthorized exten-
sion of the patent monopoly. The purpose of the patent laws is to
encourage inventors to disclose their invention in return for the grant
of a monopoly for a limited period. At the expiration of the patent,
the public is free to manufacture and use the disclosed product or process,
and "the public at large shall receive the benefits of the unrestricted
78. Naturally, the person desiring to use an unpatented invention must first discover its
essential ingredients, but with the amazing advances in the art of analysis, it is indeed difficult
to maintain a trade secret today.
79. The author is aware of the suggestions that a patentee-licensor could spread the payment
of royalties over a period exceeding the life of the patent as a matter of convenience to the
licensee. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 833
(1950); Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 382 P.2d 271, 274 (Wash. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S.
905 (1964); 31 Gao. WAsH. L. REy. 535, n.27 (1963). However, it is suggested that
the royalties to be paid over the extended period must be based on the events occurring during
the life of the patent if such an arrangement is to be upheld on the basis of convenience.
80. The Supreme Court has agreed to reconsider this question. Brulotte v. Thys Co., cert.
granted, 376 U.S. 905 (1964). The petition was granted limited to questions 1 and 2 of
the petition which are as follows:
"1. Whether it is a misuse to include in a license agreement a provision which perpetu-
ates the monopoly of a licensed patent by a requirement that royalties be paid for the use of
the invention after the patent has expired and the invention has been dedicated to the public.
"2. Whether it is a misuse or an anti-trust violation to include in a license agreement a
provision which extends the monopoly of a patent to unpatented subject matter by a provision
which requires the payment of post-expiration royalties."
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exploitation, by others, of its disclosures."'" Thus, any restrictions on
the manufacture or use of the invention of an expired patent is con-
trary to the policy and purpose of the patent laws and should not be
permitted.
ARMAND P. BOISSELLE
81. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945). It is conceivable that
the licensee is the only one capable of producing the article in question for a number of years
after the expiration of the patent, and any restriction placed on him by a license would deny
the right of the public to unrestricted exploitation of unpatented materials.
